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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to contribute to comparative research towards a 
theory of modem genocide and ways to prevent mass murder. Definitions, typologies, 
key elements, patterns, a comparison of the Holocaust with the Rwandan genocide, and 
preventive measures are included in the study. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Mass violence has riddled the twentieth century. The genocide in Rwanda marks 
the most extreme case. Violent conflict is not going on between East and West, or 
between North and South, but is being suffered in this very moment inside more than 
fifty states. The regional distribution of contemporary mass violence shows a clear 
global trend: violent conflict is infrequent in the North and West but part of normality in 
the South and some areas of the East. Much of the violence in the South would not have 
occurred and acts of genocide would not have been committed without involvement of 
the North. Northern complicity with state crimes in the South has not at all been an 
exception. 
Since 1945 there have been more than 250 violent conflicts occurring worldwide 
- until the late 1980s nearly exclusively in the Third World. Assertions of new states 
regarding their own citizen and substate collectivities were put forth in an increasingly 
aggressive way. The victims were mainly among minority nationalities, nondominant 
ethnic groups, and indigenous peoples. Ethnicity and ethnic violence became the single 
most dangerous source for violence. It produced new types of non-Clausewitzean 
warfare and modern genocide in the world. In two out of three cases of mass violence we 
find an ethnic component. That means the ethnic factor (ethnicity) is a dominant or 
influential component. 
High frequency and huge potential of forgotten wars and forgotten massacres 
became decisive regarding the lack of possibilities for structural prevention of violence, 
conflict management and transformation, as well as regarding the role of multilateralism 
in preventing mass violence. The first question "What to do in a particular situation?" is 
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linked to the particular type of conflict we are dealing with. The second question "When 
to do what?" underlines the importance of timing in response to conflict. 
Today gross human rights violations, genocidal atrocities, and in some cases 
outright genocide cause havoc in many regions of the world and result in whole 
populations being petrified in fear and mass traumatization. Violence not only kills 
humans but also kills life chances for those surviving. Today mass violence is 
intrinsically linked with ethnicization from above and the contemporary wave of ethnic 
nationalism from below. Unlike most new types of warfare, genocide is always a state 
organized crime. If attempts to prevent mass violence and genocide are to be successful 
then the quest of understanding has to concentrate on the following interlinked areas. 
First, the secrets of ethnicity and the process of ethnicization have to be 
uncovered. We are dealing with a powerful source of deep-rooted conflict, often 
nourished by destructive interaction in the past. 1 If ethnicity is combined with 
domination then things become dangerous. Ethnicity becomes a resource for political 
manipulation and vested interests. 
Second, the phenomenon of weak or failed states became more salient in the 
1990s. Awareness is growing that failed states are the most dangerous states. The well 
being, security, and sometimes the very survival of nondominant groups are put at the 
disposition of states. Failed states threaten to become genocidal states. 
Third, meaningful prevention of violent conflict has a very strong structural 
component. Such structural prevention aims at safeguarding inter-ethnic balance and an 
1 Charles Tajfel, "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination," Science 223 (11 ): 96-102. 
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accommodation of just demands on a sustainable base, providing protection and space for 
nondominant and vulnerable groups. 
Fourth, the timing of conflict management is crucial. If conflicts break out 
violently then it is already too late for most peaceful solutions. Successful prevention of 
violent conflict cannot be reactive, as a response to crisis and violent conflict, but has to 
be anticipatory. 
Fifth, the best prevention is preclusive promotion and institutionalization of 
constructive relationships between different groups. 2 Often the combination of different 
methods such as minority protection, power sharing, internal self-determination, e.g. self­
governance and forms of autonomy, is successful. 3 There is no simple cure-all. 
Several publications including Samantha Power's book, quest for an explanation 
of how and why US governments steer clear of genocidal violence. 4 Her book raises the 
question to a wide spectrum of respondents, but, in the end, fails to find an all­
encompassing answer. She is forced to remain content with the theory of avoiding a 
quagmire. I found her book and others very informative but sensed that the authors got 
lost in the wealth of information and came out short on analysis. 
The problem is that today there are only a few research projects operating on a 
larger scale with the attempt to relate the development of theoretical findings with 
empirical studies and vice-versa; not talking about the step beyond into practical action of 
2 Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973). 
3 Donald Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 
edited by Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1990) pp. 451-476. 
4 Samantha Power, "A Problemfrom Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 2002). 
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early warning and genocide prevention and peace building. This thesis seeks to fill that 
gap. 
5 
Chapter 2: Defining Genocide and Mass Murder 
The worst kind of destructive interaction of different ethnic or national groups 
( one of them in possession of the state) is mass murder and genocide. 5 Genocide is the 
most barbaric crime and has long-term effects. Cold-blooded state-organized mass 
murder is not an exceptional crime. The death toll of wars in this century is equaled by 
the death toll of genocide. 6 Genocide is the most severe type of violent conflict; its 
victims are civilians including old people, children, and even babies. Article III of the 
Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the crime 
as: 
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
( d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.7 
One of the most important observations is that genocide and colonization were 
always closely linked. The largest ever genocide in modem history was committed by 
half a dozen European states in what was later called the Third World. Large-scale 
genocide was committed against American Indians, Africans and Afro-Americans, and 
subjugated people in European colonies. 
5 Julian Burger, Report from the Frontier: The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed 
Books, 1987) pp. 83-84. Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Brookfield, VT: 
Dartmouth, 1995) pp.11-12. 
6 Ibid .. 
7 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations Treaty 
Series, 78: 277. The convention was adopted by UN General Assembly (Resolution 260 (III) A) on 9 Dec. 
1948. 
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European colonial expansion and genocide since 1500 
According to Darcy Ribeiro the Indians of the Americas were reduced by the 
Spaniards in the South and European settlers in the North from 80 million in 1492 to 3.5 
million 1750.8 Genocide against Indians has continued until today, e.g. in Paraguay, 
Guatemala, and Brazil. From 1500 onwards Africa lost one hundred million people to 
European slavery. Most enslaved Africans died under terrible conditions during mass 
transport from Africa to Americas. Genocide against Africans was continued by 
infamous lynching campaigns in the southern US.9 
It is important to understand that genocide was an inherent part of general practice 
employed by virtually all European powers throughout the colonial period, with Germany 
and Britain ranking second to Spain. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the German colonial genocide against the Herera and N ama in German Southwest Africa 
and the diverse people of Southern Tanganyika constituted preparatory stages for modem 
genocide. 10 
Definitions and cases 
Genocide is a phenomenon known since ancient times; it means actions carried 
out by a state or ruler with the intent to systematically kill a particular community of 
people or social collectivity, resulting in destroying the targeted group in whole or in part. 
Modern genocide is state-organized mass murder and crimes against humanity 
characterized by the intention of the rulers to exterminate individuals because of 
8 Darcy Ribeiro, The Americas and Civilization (New York: Dutton, 1971) p. 356. 
9 Roger Smith, "Exploring the United States' Thirty-Five-Year Reluctance to Ratify the Genocide 
Convention," Harvard Human Rights Journal 5 (Spring): pp. 227-233. 
10 John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969) p. 
172. 
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belonging to a particular national, ethnic, religious, or racial group. Victims belonging to 
a particular cultural group ( ethnocide ), to a particular political group (politicide) or to a 
particular social group (democide) are not equally well protected by the UN Anti­
Genocide Convention of 1948. 1 1  Genocide is a premeditated mass crime that has been 
systematically planned, prepared, and executed. 
Massacres are genocidal acts committed by different types of perpetrators such as 
state agents or entire agencies, political extremists and interest groups against vulnerable 
groups, which have been excluded from mainstream society. Total genocide means that 
the perpetrators aimed at the complete extermination and destruction in whole of a 
particular community or group of people, with the intent to destroy its reproduction ( as a 
group) as well as its culture and institutions. 
Typology of genocide 
The distinction of scale must be introduced. The wording of the Anti-Genocide 
Convention of 1948 suggests genocide in whole and genocide in part, thus total or full­
scale genocide and partial or large-scale genocide. Robert Melson combined this 
distinction of scale (total/partial) with the equally obvious distinction of place (domestic/ 
foreign). 12 
This also calls in the type of victims targeted. Modem full-scale genocide in this 
century, such as the ones committed by the Young Turks, the Nazis and their allies, the 
Khmer Rouge, and the Hutu power regime in Rwanda, were all directed against a 
11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations 
Treaty Series, 78: 277. 
12 Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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domestic component of the respective societies or against several components at once. In 
all four cases the state machinery was used extensively. 
The type of perpetrator, being state and non-state actors would therefore define an 
obvious distinction and third dimension of the crime of genocide. In order to broaden the 
picture I include other types of mass murder, such as massacres, to be distinguished from 
total genocide. It becomes more illustrative with reference to structural situations in 
which I will explain below. In Table 1 this typology of genocide is illustrated with a 
series of cases. 
The extreme worst case of genocide is when the perpetrators are domestic/state 
actors. This results in the total extermination of a minority, planned and executed by the 
state. Carried out by the same perpetrators, mass murder would include massacres 
against a minority organized by state agents/agencies. 
Next domestic/non-state actors resulting in full-scale genocide include European 
adventurers and invaders against indigenous groups in settler colonies of the Americas 
and Australia. Mass murder or massacres include genocidal atrocities directed against a 
minority committed by extremists/interest groups. 
Full-scale genocide occurs under foreign/state actors with colonial genocides 
committed by European powers against indigenous people (mainly Spain, Britain, 
Portugal, and Germany). The same actors result in mass murder when committed by 
invaders against civilian populations and rebellious or resisting groups. 
Finally, there is no evidence found of a full-scale genocide when foreign/non-state 
actors are the perpetrators but mass murder results when acts are committed by invading 
settlers against local populations and resisting groups. 
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Table 1: Typology of Genocide: Cases in the 10-Types Outline 
20th century full-scale genocide mass murder 
. (massacres) genocide and 
mass murder 
domestic / state 
actors 
(before 1945) 
domestic / state 
actors 
( after 1945) 
domestic/ 
non-state 
perpetrators 
foreign 
genocide / state 
actors 
foreign 
genocide/ non­
state actors 
19th century internal colonial 
genocide of the USA against the 
Indians extending into 20th 
century; large-scale genocides 
during WWI & WWII; Germans in 
FSU, Balkans & Greece; Serbs vs. 
Albanians 1912; Jews 19402 
four cases of total full-scale 
genocide in this century: Aghet, 
Shoah, Pol Pot's Cambodia 1975-
79, Rwanda 1994 
large scale genocide cases: Hima­
Tutsi army in Burundi ( 1972) vs. 
Hutu elites & Tutsi-Banyaruguru 
opposition; military regimes vs. 
Guatemala's indigenous Mayan 
majority 1980s 
Hundreds of cases 
.- :·.:- : > ·. 
worst mass murder: Stalin's massacres 
against Caucasians 1943-57, the Gulags, 
mass murder in Ukraine, etc.; massacres 
of USA against Indians 
since 1945 ( Gurr & Harff compiled 44 
large cases); Burma's military vs. 
minorities since 1948; Burma vs. 
students in 1988; pogroms against 
Palestinians since 1948, later in Shatila / 
Sabra near Beirut; pogroms against 
Chinese and mass murder of alleged 
communists in Indonesia; Apartheid 
crimes in South Africa; several hundred 
other cases, e.g. China's Tiananmen 
massacre 
by European settlers vs. several hundred cases; worst pogroms 
Amerindians; landless peasants vs. against Jews and Roma in several states 
low land Indian peoples in the of Eastern and Western Europe; lynching 
Amazon of Blacks in USA 
colonial genocide of the Germans 
vs. Herero and Nama 
no case 
USA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by 
indiscriminate bombing, killing and 
spraying of civilians in the 1970s; USSR 
dirty war against Afghani civilians 
Mercenaries in Third world conflicts; 
TNCs against marginal groups 
·• 
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Who is who: Perpetrators and victims 
There is some agreement in the question of defining the victim group largely 
following Raphael Lemkin's definition of genocide and the wording of the Anti­
Genocide Convention of 1948. 13  However, the convention would partly go further than 
the present minimal consensus, especially concerning the gray area of indirect genocidal 
practices and measures. 
Particular national, ethnic, or political groups rule a state in crisis, often as 
ethnocracy. Such dominant groups, no matter if they are demographically in a majority 
or minority position, were under particular historic circumstances able to bring the new 
state into their own, often as a consequence of colonial legacies, wars or crisis. Dominant 
groups got into position of command over the so-called monopoly of violence; they 
exercise firm control (total state) . Assertive relationships towards minority groups, the 
political opposition, religious communities, and ethnically distinct nationalities (nations 
without own state) became a dangerous source of violent conflict long ago in the South 
and increasingly so with each cycle of decolonization since 1 945 . Exclusion of 
minorities and their persecution by dominant groups commanding the states' monopolies 
of violence became the most dangerous source of destructive violence in modem times. 
In situations of exclusion there is a risk of genocide. 
13 "Genocide means . . .  acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group as such" (Article 2). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations Treaty Series, 78: 277. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe; Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944). 
1 1  
Four cases of full-scale genocide in the twentieth century 
Full-scale total genocide means that the perpetrators were aiming at the total 
destruction of a particular community of peoples (genocide in whole, not in part) and the 
result varied accordingly. There were only very few cases of total genocide before the 
twentieth century, namely the largest ever genocide committed 1492- 1750 by the Iberians 
against the American Indians and the genocide against North American Indians by 
European powers and settlers. 14 In the twentieth century alone there were four cases of 
full-scale genocide, causing more victims than in any previous period. 
1 .  the Aghet: Turkish genocide 1914-23 against the Armenians 15  
2. the Holocaust: genocides committed 1933-45 by the fascist German state and its allies 
against the European Jews, Roma, Russians, other Slavic peoples, POWs, slave 
workers, and the political opposition 1 6  
3 .  the Khmer Rouge genocide in Kampuchea 1975-79 against the Vietnamese, Cham 
Muslim and Chinese minorities as well as against the Khmer urban classes 17 
4. the Hutu-power genocide in Rwanda 1994 committed by the akazu elite, their state 
machinery, Hutu-power factions of all political parties and a huge number of common 
people against the Tutsi branch of the Banyarwanda and against Hutu opponents. 1 8  
The most deadly regimes in the twentieth century have all committed genocide 
against domestic groups, mainly the barbarian attempt to exterminate specific minorities. 
14 Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Native North American Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide, and 
Colonization (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2002) pp. 53-55. 
1 5  Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict (New Bunswick, 
NJ: Transaction, 1999). 
16  Doris. L. Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003). 
17 Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 
1975-79 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
1 8  Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst, 1995). 
12 
Chapter 3: Genocide in the Twentieth Century 
The most infamous cases of state organized crimes in modem Europe are large­
scale genocide committed during both World Wars. The executioners of the Holocaust 
were not only Germans but also local collaborators among different nations in occupied 
countries all over Europe; the executioners of the Armenian genocide were also recruited 
among non-Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire. 19 Both large-scale genocides were 
committed under the cover of warfare. However, the genocidal agenda of the 
perpetrators was known, e.g. in the case of German fascism openly announced by Hitler 
well in advance. 
War as a smoke screen for slaughter 
War provided a smoke screen for the slaughter of millions of civilian victims. 
After reaching the height of power in the declining empire in 1914, the Young Turk 
military elite began with systematic preparations for the genocide against the Armenians. 
On August 2, 1914, a secret German-Turkish agreement on the entry of Turkey at the 
side of Germany into World War I was signed.20 The situation was similar concerning 
the fascist genocides. Since 1 939 Germany was in war with its neighbors, starting with 
Poland where in the following years alone 4.4 million civilians perished. Genocide was 
one of the means totalitarian regimes in Europe used against national, ethnic, or religious 
minorities, which played leading roles in the economy and culture of their respective 
countries. 21 
19 Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. 
20 Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict, p. 1 29. 
21 Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Comparison of the Turkish genocide ( 1 9 15) and the German 
Holocaust (1939- 1 945)," Comparative Studies in Sociology, 1 ( 1 978); Robert Melson, Revolution and 
Genocide: On the Origins of Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. 
13 
The Holocaust as model genocide: Totalitarism and superior race in Germany 
Genocidal atrocities started with politicide. Violence was first directed against 
communists, trade unionists, and socialists. Mass executions and slaughter by special 
task forces such as the SA and later the SS, as the main instrument of fascist terror policy 
under the command of the Fuhrer, the Nazi power elite and the establishment of the 
National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP).22 When World War II was started 
with Hitler's  Blitzkrieg against Poland, mass executions began in 1939. Following the 
occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe, mass murder against the European Jews, 
Roma, Russians, and other people was ordered immediately and took the form of full­
scale genocide. Units of the German army and special battalions executed the mass 
murder. The infamous Einsatzgruppen A-D partly consisted of police reserve battalions 
of normal Germans. 23 Finally the civilian population and prisoners of war from the 
USSR were targeted. 24 The overkill of prisoners and millions of slave workers through 
hard labor and inhumane conditions in the concentration camps was organized similar to 
the killings in war zones. The Nazi terror reign was culminating in industrial genocide in 
places like Auschwitz, Dachau, and in other extermination factories, especially 
constructed for the execution of the Final Solution, by cremating millions, separated in 
different categories of victim, throughout the years 1942-1945. 25 
More than eighteen million people became victims of the Nazi genocide and the 
total war fascist Germany brought over Eastern Europe; this excludes the victims in 
22 Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (Westview Press, 2002) pp. 139-140. 
23 Ibid., p. 138. 
24 Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. 
25 Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, pp. 102-108. 
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southeastern Europe and Northern Africa.26 German fascism murdered six million Jews, 
3.3 million Soviet POWs, two million Romani, almost one million Serbs, and millions of 
others. 27 The indirect death toll among the civilian populations ( democide) was 
enormous. Seven million people died of hunger during the German extermination war in 
the hinterlands of the former Soviet Union only.28 These were cases of intentional mass 
murder. In both cases (Germany 1940s and Turkey 1910s) the exterminatory ideologies 
used were an inherent part of premodem ethnist or racist theories. 
Modem genocide in the South: Ongoing legacies of colonialism 
Examples of fifty years of modem post-colonial genocide, 1948 to 1998, are 
manifold. 29 Legacies of colonialism led to genocide or genocidal atrocities in different 
parts of the world since the Second World War. Other destructive forms of interaction 
between states and nations/nationalities are to be considered. Destructive interaction took 
the form of forced assimilation of non-dominant groups; territorial invasion of minority 
areas by state actors; settlement policy in indigenous territories, infiltration of homelands 
of minorities or indigenous groups; forced massive transfer of populations, forced 
resettlement, ethnic cleansing, expulsion, and deportation. 30 In many cases genocide was 
26 Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust. 
27 John G. Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned 
Citizen (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001) p. 6. 
28 Ibid . .  
29 Burma since 1948, Southern and Central Sudan since 1960, Rwanda since 1959 and Burundi since 1964, 
Timor from 1974, Pol Pot' s Cambodia in the 1970s, Burundi' s selective genocide in 1972, Genocide 
against American Indians: continued in the 1970s against the Ache in Paraguay, in the 1980s against 
Guatemala' s  indigenous Mayan majority, in the 1990s against the Yanomami and other low land Indian 
people in the Brazilian Amazon region, Burundi' s second partial genocide in 1993, in Congo-Zaire since 
the 1970s, Rwanda 1994. 
30 Examples for massive population transfer: Soviet Union in the Baltic states since 1945, China in Tibet 
and Eastern Turkestan since the 1950s, Indonesia with its policy of transmigration in West Papua, 
Moluccas, and Aceh, Bangla Desh in the Chittagong Hill Tracts since 1979, Ethiopia under Mengistu in 
Oromia, in Gambella lowlands and the inter lake area (until 1990), Iraq and Iran in Kurdestan. 
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committed in a situation of crisis, internal turmoil, or civil war, as for instance in Burma, 
Indochina, Sudan, and Central Africa.3 1  The Rwandan genocide is only the most extreme 
case. Defenselessness of the victims or lack of formal power, as witnessed in Rwanda, 
has been analyzed as contributing to the likelihood of genocide.32 The Hutu extremists 
killed an estimated 900,000 to 1.2 million. This represents three times more victims then 
in all violent conflicts of the 1990s in the former USSR and in Yugoslavia together. 
31 Frank Chalk and Kurt Johassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
32 Helen Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," Current Sociology 38, 1 ( 1990). 
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Chapter 4: Patterns of Total Genocide 
The elaboration of a comprehensive typology of genocides, based on the 
definition of clear-cut criteria, is a demanding task. Identification of key elements of 
comparison and of general patterns of genocides may help to reduce the voids of 
comparative genocide research. This would contribute to the key objective of such 
research, the prevention of future genocide and mass violence. Barbara Harff and Robert 
Melson have both identified a number of common patterns of modern genocides. 33 
Melson saw "four tidal waves of ethno-national conflict and genocide in the wake of 
crushing or crumbling states and empires". 34 
The progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire produced the first of the 
four total domestic genocides in this century, the Aghet, the destruction of the Armenia�s 
in Anatolia by the regime of the Young Turks. The collapse of the German and Austro­
Hungarian empires in WWI produced instability and the growth of fascism in Germany 
since the 1920. _Under the cover of WWII_ the Nazis and their willing local supporters 
committed large-scale genocide at home and in the occupied countries. By 1945 this had 
resulted in the intended total extermination of the European Jews and the Roma. Partial 
genocide was committed against a large number of Slavic people. Large-scale genocide 
was committed against millions of slave workers and POW s. 35 
The decolonization period consisted of artificial and weak states searching for 
ways of nation building, which was often violently directed against minorities and the 
33 Barbara Harff, "The Ethiology of Genocides," in Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski, 
Genocide in the Modem Age: Ethiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (New York: Greenwood Press 
1987), pp. 41-60. 
34 Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. 
35 Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust. 
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political opposition. Endless ethnic civil wars, liberation wars, secessions, and slaughter 
of populations began soon after WWII in the Africa-Asian space. In Former British India 
the separation of India and Pakistan ended in large-scale communal violence and horrible 
bloodshed. Internal wars in Burma since 1948, the secession of Eastern Pakistan, and the 
civil war in Sri Lanka crippled South Asia, followed by mass violence in Sudan, Algeria, 
Indochina, Nigeria/Biafra, Indonesia, Uganda, Rwanda-Burundi, Former Portuguese 
Africa, and the Hom of Africa. 36 
The collapse of the federations of the USSR and Yugoslavia led to comparatively 
less violent wave of wars, ethnic cleansing, and communal violence. In this period falls 
the last and most rapid genocide of this century in Rwanda 1994, which was partly a 
result of the end of the Cold War. The Rwandan genocide resulted in more destruction in 
terms of loss of human lives than the ongoing instability, crisis, and warfare in parts of 
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Rwanda was the first genocide in modem 
history characterized by a massive participation of common people. 
Common elements and patterns of genocidal processes 
Analyzing and comparing the four total modem genocides of the twentieth 
century produces a set of common elements and patterns of genocidal processes. Patterns 
can be found by looking at the perpetrators and their environments. We identify and 
explore 
- the role of the elite, the core organizers, legitimizers and perpetrators of genocide, and 
their relations to the mass of willing executioners, 
- the internal and external conditions they find and create, 
- the context in which they act, 
36 John G. Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned 
Citizen (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001)  pp. 1 3, 99, 1 14, 260. 
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- the political environment in which they take the decision to destroy, 
- the way genocidal extremists gain the state power and transform it, 
- the type of victims they chose, 
- the exterminatory ideology they use, and 
- the systematic way they plan, prepare and execute the crime of genocide. 
Elites, perpetrators, objectives and the context of the crime 
First we would look at the perpetrators, their ideology, the process of 
victimization, and the way they executed the crime of genocide. An organized and 
vicious elite is more likely to gain state power in situations of deep historic changes. 
Under certain internal and external conditions they succeed in imposing their genocidal 
and destructive aims. The agendas of such leaders are to destroy specific domestic 
groups, which are as a rule always in a non-dominant and minority position.37 
Genocidal elites try to penetrate and dominate the state. Their objective is to 
impose their aims on the state machinery they have conquered and on the majority people 
of their respective societies. The modern nation state is the "predominant culprit in 
genocides". 38 Evidently the likelihood to realize such aims is much higher in a 
totalitarian system then in a democratic one. However, periods of imposed 
democratization can be conductive to genocide, as the case of Rwanda exhibits in the 
most drastic way. 
The context is characterized by rapid political, social, and structural changes 
which were described by the context of "national upheaval"39, separatist conflict, internal 
37 Neil J. Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 
2002) p. 187. 
38 Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. 
39 Ibid . .  
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strife, rebellion or "revolution"40• What is meant are rapid or abrupt historic changes 
following an extended period of crisis. The aim of genocide is part of a larger project of 
the nation-state (re )formation or its revision. This includes all the different processes of 
changing regimes, moving of boundaries or loss of territory, warfare or security threats 
resulting from (or perceived as) challenges to the dominant groups identity and to the 
identity of the national political community. 
Narrow nationalism, exterminatory ideology, and victimization 
The redefinition or confusion of national identity by the power elites is a central 
point. The perceived struggle for national survival, against internal and external enemies, 
has to become somewhat plausible for the majority group. The foreign minorities will 
function as scapegoats. The nation needs to be purified. The elimination of so-called 
"foreign elements from within',41 is one of the common denominators of total modem 
genocide. In reality all total domestic genocides were preceded not so much by real 
challenges to national identity rather then by challenges to the dominant power strata, 
having won, consolidated or maintained its power by use of force in an outright unstable 
situation. 
The intentions of the killers are expressed in their exterminatory ideology. This 
ideology will always take up older stereotypes. The aim of the power elite is to single out 
and exclude a group as the enemy of state and society. Extremist regimes are essentially 
combining militarism, ethno-chauvinism, and ultra-nationalism with promises for their 
population's bright future. They try to restore the allegedly threatened identity of their 
40 Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. 
41 Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. 
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political constituency on a narrow hybrid base. The result is the ethnicization of the 
nation. If any of its key elements came under heavy internal or external pressure for 
change then the reaction was fierce and in the end self-destructive. 
Support for genocide by a minority, and more important the indifference of the 
majority, can ultimately be won if victimized groups are presented as racially, ethnically, 
religiously, or morally different from the dominant group. Harff wrote of the "most 
different groups" to become scapegoats for losses and "national frustrations" and the 
targets of destruction.42 Most successful, this proved the construction of close links 
between domestic enemies and external aggressors by the genocidal elites. Individual 
victims may often not be easily identifiable, and there is usually a large gray area calling 
for arbitrary solutions. As a result the target group becomes visible and easily 
identifiable, as an imagined entity of domestic enemies seen as foreigners. 
Extremist power-elites, willing executioners and lack of external constraints 
Decisive elements are the exacerbation of existing internal cleavages, the lack of 
external constraints in implementing so-called final solutions or/and foreign support for 
it, and the control of the state by the power elites to allow for a genocidal state. Such a 
state needs willing executioners. Of further importance is a subservient state bureaucracy 
and obedient or extremist sections of armed forces or special troops. Conductive to the 
genocidal aim are the great fear and confusion among the national population, the well­
organized massive support by their core political constituencies, and the at least 
lukewarm support among larger sections of grassroots. Describing the genocidal elites as 
simply power-mad is not sufficient. There are structural reasons for their drive to state-
42 Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. 
centrism and extreme centralization of power, often symbolically in one person with a 
single party platform. Obviously such a plan is bound to end in totalitarism and self­
destruction. Often there is little or no external pressure to prevent the worst. 
2 1  
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Chapter 5: The State-Organized Genocide in Rwanda 1994: A Crime of Obedience 
The genocide in Rwanda in 1 994 was a well-advertised and well-prepared attempt 
to obliterate a minority. The whole state apparatus was mobilized for the purposes of 
exterminating the Tutsi group. Over a period of months, public and private media called 
upon loyal citizens to do their duty and dispatch their neighbors. The Catholic Church 
and other churches (except the Muslims) failed disgracefully and, as institutions, kept up 
a stubborn silence. 43 Donor countries were struck with blindness. Rationale for such 
behavior includes the United States' thinning patience for peacekeeping. The Clinton 
administration had taken office better disposed toward peacekeeping than any other 
administration in US history. But Congress owed half a billion dollars in UN dues and 
peacekeeping costs. It had tired of its obligation to foot one-third of the bill for what had 
come to feel like an insatiable global appetite for mischief and an equally insatiable UN 
appetite for missions. The Clinton White House agreed that the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations needed fixing and insisted that the UN "learn to say no" to 
chancy or costly missions. Rwanda was extremely low on the list of American priorities. 
The media prepared the ground for the final solution, especially the radio stations. 
The citizens were encouraged to hate the Tutsi and their accomplices. From April 6, 
1 994 they were ordered to kill their fellow citizens. 44 Mass participation in genocidal 
atrocities involved a huge number of the male Hutu population. The genocide has to be 
analyzed as a crime of obedience. Extermination was facilitated by a totalitarian 
administrative system on five levels. 
43 Peter Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since 
the Holocaust (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)  p. 159. 
44 Ibid. ,  pp. 1 56- 167. 
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The population played a direct, active, and massive part in a state ordered act of 
genocide to which practically the whole minority of Tutsis who had remained in the 
country fell victim.45 The genocide in Rwanda was an enormous crime of subordination 
and submission to the murderous command of a state. Only half the population remained 
in the country; the other half either fled or was murdered. The evacuation produced the 
greatest and most ambivalent refugee crisis of modem times. 
It will be many years before one can mention Rwanda without evoking the horror 
of mutilated bodies and severed limbs floating down the Kagera River. Yet very few 
Americans, even well informed ones, possess even the most rudimentary background 
needed to understand what happened there. Even people who know a great deal about 
Africa typically know very little about Rwanda; after all, dozens of countries crowd the 
continent, and Rwanda has had relatively little political, economic, or cultural impact 
beyond east-central Africa. The few Americans who knew anything at all about Rwanda 
prior to the massacres knew it as one of the centers of Africa's uncontrollable AIDS 
epidemic. 
At first, a mass confusion surrounded the events of the spring of 1994, starting 
with the apparent precipitating factor- the fatal downing of April 6 of a plane carrying the 
Hutu president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarima, and his counterpart from Burundi, also a 
Hutu, Cyprien Ntaryamira.46 Months after the massacres became headline news, Jean 
Kambanda, prime minister of the Rwandan (Hutu) government-in-exile, protested that the 
45 Josias Semuj anga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003). 
46 Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell " America and the Age of Genocide (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 2002) p. 329. 
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Tutsis had been the ones guilty of genocide against the Hutus.47 Kajuga, Kambanda, and 
other Hutu extremists denied the existence of an organized massacre; instead, they 
painted a picture of civil war, in which their side, the "patriotic" Hutus, engaged 
primarily in self-defense, though some regrettable atrocities occurred.48 
The crime of genocide and the United Nations 
The source of one of Central Africa's recent turmoil was Rwanda. The politics of 
genocide have been a planned, conscious strategy applied from 1990 onwards. The 
clique of powerful people around dictator Habyarimana (Akazu) superimposed a 
pathological plan to murder all Tutsi and the political opposition among the Hutu in order 
not to implement the plan of power sharing agreed in the Arusha Accords 1993.49 
I analyze three phases of escalation from fall 1990. The first phase of escalation 
began with the Uganda based invasion by the RPF rebels; it ended with Habyarimana's 
MRND regime apparently giving way on the major points of contention in March 1992. 
At the same time, the extreme political polarization began, and the organizational 
preparations for the genocide were expedited. The second phase of escalation was 
triggered by the regime's concessions and ended with the signature of the Arusha peace 
agreement in August 1993. Against the background of the successful peace negotiations 
of 1 992-93, this phase led to a hardening of the attitude of rejection and was 
characterized by a continuation of preparations for the final solution, an intensive racist 
propaganda campaign, and a perverting of the notion of democratization. The third phase 
of escalation, from fall 1993 until the start of the genocide in April 1994, resulted in the 
47 Raymond Bonner, "Rwanda Now Faces Painful Ordeal of Rebirth," New York Times, 29 Dec. 1994, A l .  
48 Ibid . .  
49 Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide, pp. 25, 44, 205. 
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whole state being taken over by the extremists and to the launch of a massive hate 
campaign. During this phase, the failure of the United Nations to underpin and enforce 
the Arusha peace became evident. 
Getting the option of force established as part of government policy 
From the time of the RP A invasion in October 1990, a terrible polarization began 
to take place in society; there was an increase in right wing extremism and fascism, and 
the option of force began to be established as part of government policy (Phase 1 ). 
Alongside these destructive political developments, the organizational preconditions for 
the genocide began to be systematically put in place on the orders of the Akazu power 
elite. At the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, various state bodies began to push 
ahead with the relevant preparations on a comprehensive basis and with great criminal 
gusto. The society was militarized by means of mass recruitment to the army and 
presidential guard based on the threat posed to the regime by the military invasion by 
RP A rebels (October 1, 1990). The guerrilla war was confined to parts of the northern 
hill country; therefore, the buildup of the militias had nothing to do with the fight against 
the RPA.50 
The extremist, eliminatory ideology was not confined to a handful of misguided 
individuals; it was developed and disseminated by paid Hutu extremists as an official 
ideology. The destructiveness and pathological nature of Hutu extremism were revealed 
already in 1991 in the genocide perpetrated on the small Bagogwe group in northwestern 
Rwanda in January/February 1991. The ideological propaganda and relentless agitation 
50 Semuj anga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide, p. 195. 
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of the Hutu population were intended to stimulate social envy. The extremists exploited 
the inferiority complexes that had been implanted in colonial times in regard to the Tutsi 
as alleged born rulers. This was even despite the fact that the Tutsi had, in reality, been 
oppressed and persecuted since 1959.51 The media campaign to create fears about threats 
to the overwhelming majority from the minority acquired plausibility as a result of the 
lingering civil war under way in Burundi since the murder of the moderate FRODEBU 
president Melchior Ndadaye (Burundi's  first Hutu head of state) in October 1993.52 
The force option was given an enormous legitimatory boost as a result of the 
traditional moral authorities being taken into state ownership and as a result of the silence 
of all the Christian churches. The increased involvement of the leadership and many 
secular followers of the powerful Catholic Church became obvious. The negligence of 
the Catholic Church was not simply a faux pas on the part of individual bishops, 
missionaries, priests, or lay people. The church structures themselves were mobilized by 
the clergy, most of whom were of an extremist bent, and by the mass of church-going 
supporters and accomplices of the extremists. 53 
Democratization and the preparations for the genocide 
In March 1992, when Habyarimana gave in on the refugee question and declared 
his willingness to enter into peace talks with the RPF, the destructive dynamic seemed to 
have been halted. However, the formation of a coalition government in April 1992 soon 
had a boomerang effect. Against the background of the successful peace negotiations in 
51 Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, pp. 82-84. 
52 Ibid., p. 88. 
53 Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the 
Holocaust, pp. 158- 159. 
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Arusha in 1992-93, the extremists took these concessions as a ground for intensifying the 
campaigning. 54 This negative dynamic grew stronger with the first Arusha protocol in 
August 1992, making the option of the use of force more acute within government policy. 
The top-down perversion of democratization, following its introduction in March 
1992, under external pressure and in conditions of permanent emergency, led to the 
opposite of what was originally intended. The freedom to organize (foundation of 
political parties) and freedom of the press were exploited without interference by the 
Hutu extremists (to launch a massive campaign). The negotiations in Arusha were 
obstructed by the regime and eventually failed on the question of the division of power 
with opposition forces, notably the RPF (Arusha agreement of January 1993).55 The 
failure of the UN to react appropriately to repeated verifiable warnings of genocide is 
inexcusable; an arms-embargo should have been declared in 1991; hardly any criticism 
was voiced of France's criminal policy in Rwanda.56 
State bodies coordinated the preparations for the genocide. The challenge 
presented to the state and its monopoly on force by the countrywide build-up of the 
militias belonging to the MRND (lnterahamwe) and CDR (lmpuzi) was only apparent; in 
reality, the aim was to strengthen the state and ethnic monopoly on force.57 The Hutu 
nationalists secured a position of predominance; they got rid of the remaining moderates 
by threats and political assassinations, put their own adherents into decision-making 
positions, and worked constantly on public opinion. The general climate of brutalization 
54 Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, p. 91. 
55 Semuj anga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide, p. 44. 
56 Hirsch, Anti-Genocide: Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger, 2002) p. 91. 
57 Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the 
Holocaust, p. 158 .  
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was reinforced by the three pogroms against the ethnic minorities of the Bagogwe, 
Bahima, and Bugesera-Tutsi perpetrated by Hutu extremists with official support 
between 1991 and 1993. The victimization and dehumanization of all Tutsi was 
deliberately escalated from the time of the Bugesera pogrom in 1992. 
The failure of the UN: extremists gain control of the state apparatus 
Most grave and unforgivable was the miscalculation of the situation by the UN at 
the end of 1993. This happened despite the fact that accurate information was available 
after the Milobs had presented UNAMIR force commander Romeo Dallaire with 
alarming detailed reports, which Dallaire had faxed to the chief of UN peace operations.58 
The decisive development of Phase 3 is the seizure of the state's  monopoly of 
force by the extremists. It was not the loss of the monopoly on force that cleared the way 
for the strategy of genocide in Rwanda, as some experts believed, overlooking the fact 
that the monopoly on force had long since been captured. One cannot talk of a loss, 
given that at no time was there a change in command and that the party militias were an 
integral element in the Akazu's monopoly on force. The societal element, and also a 
degree of social control, was undoubtedly present, but it was too weak compared with the 
strong state. 
The problem began when the monopoly on force was altered. Phase 3 was 
marked by the take over of all state apparatuses by extremists, a massive hate campaign, 
58 Ronayne, Never Again ? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the 
Holocaust, pp. 155-156. 
The fax of January 1, 1994 contained the complete plans for the genocide. UNAMIR security experts had 
analyzed the structure of the military, the location of the arms-depots was known, as were the operational 
plans, and yet the UN remained paralyzed. The Belgian secret services were aware of secret arms 
collections, and on February 2, 1994 they issued an urgent warning. On January 11, 1994, Gen. Dallaire 
alerted the UN. 
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and the broad dissemination of the pathological idea of obliteration among the population 
characterized the situation from the time of the signature of the Arusha agreement in 
August 1993, on the eve of the genocide. The escalation of this process of violence over 
the last phase of approximately seven months, up to the start of the genocide on April 6, 
1994, might still have been halted by outside intervention. Among the elements were: 
The failure of the UN to back up the Arusha settlement, negotiated through the 
intermediary of Tanzania and the OAU from June 1992 to August 1993, to ensure it was 
implemented, and to make worst case preparations. The failure of the international 
community was characterized by total absence of a coherent policy of conflict mitigation. 
The six most important donor countries of the Habyarimana regime 1991- 1993, Belgium, 
Germany, France, USA, Switzerland, and Canada failed to suspend the aid flows.59 Their 
failure to use comprehensive conditionality was a crucial factor, which gave signals of 
sympathy and support to the regime. Under the Anti-Genocide Convention of 1948 the 
international community was obligated to intervene once early warnings had clearly 
revealed the intention to destroy the Tutsi minority and the Hutu opposition. 
The complete confusion caused among the Rwandan population by the campaigns 
against alleged collaboration with the RPF and by the hate campaign conducted by the 
private radio station, RTLM, was an important element. All the opposition parties in 
Rwanda split into genocidal factions under pressure from the increasingly influential 
Hutu extremists of the MRND and CDR. Violence against the Tutsi, against smaller 
59 Tor Sellstrom and Lennart Wohlgemuth, "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: 
Historical Perspective, Some Explanatory Factors," Online, 29 Aug. 2003. 
<http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/R wanda/R wanda4c.htm> 
Linda de Hoyos, "The Hoax Embedded in the UN Inquiry Report on the Rwanda Genocide," I Feb. 2000, 
Online, 30 Aug. 2003. <http://www.inshuti.org/hoyos2.htm> 
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minorities, and against the political opposition became normal. Violence was encouraged 
by the absence of punishment for acts of terror against excluded minorities and 
dissidents. 
According to expert reports, public accusations by opposition politicians and 
statements by the perpetrators themselves aimed to utilize the state to further prosecute 
their genocidal campaign. Their declared aims were the extermination of the Tutsi and 
the removal of the Hutu opposition. The extremists assumed control of almost all state 
apparatuses having first acquired a greater following through state support; moderate 
opposition members were reduced to just a handful in the state administration. 
Several foreign secret services monitored the militias but Western governments 
refrained from any pressures and did not intervene. The donors never conditioned the 
large aid flows. Aid flows even increased by fifty percent since 1990: this was seen as a 
clear signal of support by the akazu and the Hutu power extremists.60 On the eve of the 
genocide, the militarists and fascist extremists were in command of the state monopoly 
on force and were waiting for the signal to strike. 
The shooting down of the dictator's  aircraft by two ground-to-air missiles as it 
came in to land at Kigali was taken by certain sections of the army and presidential guard 
as an opportunity for the armed gangs to launch a strike against the opposition gangs. 
The deliberate shooting down of the aircraft cannot be reinterpreted as a start to an 
unplanned wave of bloodlust. 
60 Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Historical 
Perspective, Some Explanatory Factors," <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Rwanda/Rwanda4c.htm> 
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The threat of a loss of power is crucial. The Akazu elite gave the order for the 
mass murder when it saw its position of power jeopardized by Habyarimana' s promise 
that the Arusha agreement would finally be implemented.61  In the interests of preserving 
its power, the Akazu elite made use of a racist ideology whose pathological consequence 
was the annihilation of the minority and the molding of the majority into a nation of 
murderers. 
The perpetrators: organizers and executioners 
The main bodies and organizations that carried out the genocide were the 
presidential guard, two paramilitary youth organizations (the MRND Interahamwe and 
the CDR Impuza Mugambi killer troops )62, the army; and almost the entire state' s 
administrative apparatus. These bodies were the main perpetrators of the genocide, in 
their capacity as executing authorities. Members of the higher professional groups and a 
large proportion of church leaders and religious functionaries (not including the Muslims) 
also played a major part as agitators and executive organs. The Christian churches, 
including the Catholic Church, which, until very shortly before this, had claimed a 
monopoly on public morality, remained tight lipped through it all . The ethnicist 
ideologies preached by the missionaries and colonialists were immoral and abhorrent. 
The apocalyptic end result of ideologies of exclusion is illustrated in the most horrific 
way in Rwanda. 
61 The Akazu power elite was the clique around Agathe Habyarimana, the "true ruler of Rwanda", and also 
included financiers and military leaders who enjoyed the protection of the state. 
62 The Interahamwe ("those who stand together") was set up by the regime in 1990 as a youth wing of the 
MRND. Its leaders belonged to the Habyarimana clique. It was described by some observers as extreme 
right wing and by others as fascist. In April 1994, together with the CDR Impuzi Mugambi ("those of 
single purpose"), they made a total of about 60,000 killers. 
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One of the aims of the Akazu power elite around the wife of the dictator 
Habyarimana was to mobilize the mass of the people as volunteers, under orders, or 
under constraint. It was intended that every Rwandan Hutu should participate in the 
genocide. To ensure that the order was obeyed, a few hundred suitable party soldiers 
were chosen from each community and trained as killers. Alongside the army, the 
Interahamwe was the largest and most brutal killing organization. The policy of genocide 
was the Akazu' s ultimate strategy of power retention. This clique of powerful 
individuals around the dictator and his wife recruited not only the entire state apparatus as 
an instrument of genocide, but the entire majority population of the Hutu, whom it called 
upon and in some cases forced to destroy the national minorities and the opposition.63 
The Hutu extremists assumed complete control over all the organs of the state and 
the media. The medium most used by the extremists was the radio, the state-run Radio 
Rwanda and the private Radio Televisio� des Milles Collines (RTLM).64 These two 
stations waged a racist and chauvinist campaign of encouragement against the Tutsi 
minority and the political opposition waged over a period of months. On April 6, 1 994 at 
6 p.m., RTLM gave the starting signal for the massacre.65 Every day after this, Rwanda's 
citizens were openly called upon to go out and do their job, in other words, murder all 
Tutsis in the neighborhood. 
63 Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide. pp. 3 1 ,  193. 
64 Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the 
Holocaust, p. 1 57. 
65 Ibid . .  
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Watching genodde on TV 
World public opinion reacted with outrage when CNN broadcast amateur videos 
of people being hunted down, butchered, and savagely executed on the streets of the 
capital, Kigali. One video in the ICRC archives, filmed from the Milles Collines hotel (to 
which many foreigners had fled), showed victims being insulted and beaten. Rigid with 
fear, the victims were made to kneel down in a row in the street and then, one after the 
other, had their heads chopped off. Images of indescribable cruelty such as these 
dominated international news coverage for no more than a few days. The reason is a 
simple one. During the first week of the genocide, missionaries and development 
workers provided the foreign media with some of their most reliable information; but 
because all whites except a few missionaries and nuns then fled the country, this source 
of information soon dried up. The reports then concentrated either on military activities, 
on the UN' s indecision and futile gestures, or on the thousands of bodies of murdered 
Tutsi washed ashore in Lake Victoria. Days later CNN and all the other television 
stations began to focus on the streams of refugees. Exactly why the people were fleeing 
was left unclear in many reports. 66 
How the administration was exploited 
Rwanda had a system of totalitarian control that was probably unique in Africa. 
The central government was able to exert direct influence on events in the ten 
prefectures, 14 7 local communities, and thousands of sectors and cells, right down to the 
nyakumi (units of ten families) . The cells and nyakumi were creations of the MRND 
�onayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the 
Holocaust, pp. 160- 16 1 .  
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party of unity and were introduced in the 1970s; they are grassroots units.67 They are 
alleged to have been introduced as a result of Habyarimana' s admiration for the Stalinist 
system of repression, but they are also reminiscent of the block warden system operated 
by the Nazis in Germany. (Similarities with fascist models are to be found in every 
organizational aspect of the genocide.) As a result of all this, the order to hunt down and 
kill the Tutsi was carried out within a few days in almost every part of the country. 
Thanks to the totalitarian administrative apparatus perfected over a period of thirty-five 
years, the authoritarian state's  racist manipulation was comprehensive in its effect. The 
utilization of the totalitarian administrative apparatus, with its five hierarchical levels, the 
mobilization of all branches of the machinery of repression, the enforced recruitment of 
civilians, a long-term organized campaign by the media-these were the elements that 
helped ensure the devastating efficiency of the genocide. The regime's aim of securing 
mass participation in the genocide through propaganda and force, equaled the creation of 
a single people under a single leader. The guiding notion was not that of a single nation 
embracing all Rwandans but that of an ethnically cleansed community of murderers 
permanently bound together by a horrific bloody deed. 
For the first time in modem history, a state succeeded in transformi�g the mass of 
its population into murderers. To begin with, the presidential guard and the armed gangs 
went around with long computer printouts listing the names of dissidents; these 
individuals were hunted down and killed throughout the country from the very first 
murderous night. The death squads and the presidential guard started on the planned 
67 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, p. 76. 
bloodbath right from April 6, 1994, and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans 
subsequently fell victim to it.68 
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The arrest of the popular prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (the leader of 
the moderate wing of the Hutu-dominated MOR denounced as a traitress by the 
extremists) and her murder along with her bodyguards, carried out in the most inhuman 
way by the presidential guard was meant to spread fear and horror.69 Executions, public 
torturing, and the sadistic publicized elimination of dissidents formed the prelude to the 
countrywide mass murder. 
The role of the local authorities 
The most important link in the chain was the civilian authorities. The great 
majority of them proved willing instruments of the Akazu power elite's genocidal policy 
when it came to organizing massacres in small towns, villages, and the hill country. The 
officials not only passed on orders to kill Tutsi civilians; they facilitated the mass 
slaughter by arranging the distribution of weapons and the transport of army troops and 
death squads, by co-coordinating the deployment of professional killers, by organizing 
the distribution of the possessions of those who had been murdered, and so on. The 
mayors (bourgmestres) played a crucial role; they passed on the orders to kill to the heads 
of sectors. Many obeyed out of subservience. The heads of sectors in their tum passed 
the orders to the cell leaders. 
68 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, pp. 219-224. 
69 The 440 Belgian UN soldiers were the backbone of the 2,500-strong UN AMIR. Nine days after the death 
of the prime minister and her bodyguard, the Belgian government decided to withdraw the contingent. Prior 
to this, all 1,500 Belgian citizens had been flown out. 
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Not only did officials play a basic organizational part in ensuring that the 
genocide was carried out countrywide; they often went beyond what was required of 
them. Mayors summoned the local population to meetings at which agitators provoked 
them to kill the resident Tutsis. All the possessions of the dead became the property of 
the killers. Everyone was officially permitted to bum down houses belonging to Tutsis 
and to slaughter and eat their cows. Minor officials were in charge of organizing the 
production. These tasks had to be performed by officials in all the local communities 
otherwise they themselves were killed by members of the presidential guard. Because 
prefects, assistant prefects, and mayors were personally appointed by Habyarimana, they 
were usually members of the MRND. After 1 990, some of them joined the genocidal 
pawa (power) wing of the opposition parties. Many high-ranking officials were 
themselves murderers. Most of them appear to have been in the habit of carrying a 
weapon (usually an AK47), for quite a long time before this, ostensibly for security 
reasons, and they made liberal use of these against Tutsi civilians during the genocide. 
Only a handful of officials belonged to the opposition; they were among the first to be 
killed. 
According to concurring statements by survivors and eyewitnesses, in many 
places (for example, in Nyakizu, Kigembe, and Kibayi, along the border with Burundi), 
senior officials plotted the massacre of Tutsi refugees from inland who were making their 
way in large groups to the borders. They demanded that the refugees register before 
crossing the border, guaranteeing them a safe house in the local administrative buildings 
or in buildings belonging to the parishes-only to use the time gained to organize the 
deployment of the professional murderers, the militias and gendarmes, and, in some 
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cases, the army. Community centers and schools became the setting for mass murders all 
over the country, particularly along the borders. 
Even in the smallest settlements, at the instigation of bureaucracy, the male Hutu 
population was urged to arm themselves with pangas (long knives), axes, and clubs, and 
go out and kill. Obedience to the orders of the authorities was something that had been 
taught. In Rwanda, the authorities comprise not only the powerful mayors, but also the 
sector and cell heads, the gendarmes, teachers, and the Catholic Church as represented by 
parish priests, curates, and nuns. All the named local authorities were involved in the 
genocide at the highest levels as organizers, encouragers, or role models. 
The role of NGOs and the export of the politics of genocide 
The effects of the African Holocaust in Rwanda were devastating: In the middle 
of 1994 half of Rwanda's population was either killed or had fled the country. After the 
genocide seventy percent of the population was women, many were ill treated and 
raped.70 Thousands of children are traumatized. The morale was broken, the social 
fabric disintegrated, the economy shattered, the state administration was out of order. 
Crucial for the regime was the non-reaction of the United Nations. Despite earli_er 
warnings, the UN remained disunited, paralyzed, and inactive in the case of Rwanda. 
The weeks of inactivity by the UN, in the face of the horrific organized massacre of Tutsi 
civilians by militia forces, the police and the army, seem incomprehensible to many. 
With that being said, investigation of the genocide and prosecution of the perpetrators 
had since been very slow getting off the ground. The International Criminal Tribunal on 
70 Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the 
Holocaust, p. 159. 
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Rwanda (ICTR) was struggling with budget problems and had too few people 
investigating and too many administrating. In dealing with the genocide, the UN seemed 
to be acting without any kind of plan. 
The challenges of a complex emergency were too great for the international 
community. The giant disaster relief went into the trap. Humanitarism wanted to fill a 
political vacuum. Nobody was talking about justice, but all NGOs and UN agencies were 
talking about aid. The separation of killers and refugees never took place. A chain of 
huge refugee camps in the border areas consequently became military camps. Aid 
contributed to lengthening a deadly conflict. Humanitarian NGOs lost their innocence 
when it became clear that they were feeding perpetrators of genocide and prolonging a 
deadly conflict. Infiltration of genocidal FAR and Interahamwe elements to Rwanda 
went on throughout 1995 and 1996. Only the revolt of the Banyamulenge rebels in K.ivu 
in fall of 1996 and the military defeat of the perpetrators of genocide in the camps 
brought dramatic change. The return of 800,000 refugees from Congo-Zaire in 
November 1996 was followed by as many from camps in Tanzania. The mass return was 
a new challenge for a ravaged country and had serious destabilizing effects in Rwanda 
throughout 1997 and 1998. 
The American position 
The United States sounded a particularly strident voice of caution over the issue 
of an expanded UN presence in Rwanda. As events unfolded in Rwanda, American 
policy makers faced the specter of the Somalia disaster as they deliberated possible 
options. In December 1992, American forces entered Somalia as part of a UN mission to 
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feed starving people in a nation wracked by internal chaos. With the CNN broadcasting 
images of the soldiers coming ashore to rescue the at-risk population, this gesture of 
international goodwill seemed destined for success.71 
Over the next year, the mission expanded from humanitarian relief to include 
elements of nation building, helping Somalia establish some sort of workable, democratic 
polity. As a result of this so-called mission creep, American forces found themselves at 
odds with local Mogadishu warlords. This conflict culminated on October 3, 1993, with 
a firefight between American Rangers, members of the Army's elite Delta Force, and 
forces loyal to Mohammed Aideed. After hours of intense fighting, eighteen Americans 
lay dead and seventy-three wounded. 72 
Any loss of life is difficult enough, but Somalia earned its lasting legacy when 
triumphant Somalis dragged the body of a perished American helicopter pilot through the 
streets of Mogadishu. Covered in the news complete with video footage, the episode 
seared powerful images into the memories of Americans. Somalia became a sobering 
and formative experience for US policy. 
In the military establishment, an angry belief that the Clinton administration had 
failed to provide requested equipment and irritation at its subsequent hasty withdrawal 
from Somalia following the Battle of Mogadishu contributed to a reluctance to commit 
American forces to another UN mission, especially one in Africa. At the same time, the 
dictates of domestic politics suggested few if any influential constituencies for American 
involvement in Africa following the Somalia debacle. To put it simply, the president 
7 1 Thomas Keenan, "Live from . . .  / En direct de . . .  ," Back to the Front: Tourisms of War, (Caen: FRAC, 
Basse-Normandie, 1994) pp. 130-163. 
72 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modem War (New York: Penguin USA, 2000). 
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feared losing more votes and opinion poll percentage points than he would gain over any 
African intervention. 
The Pentagon based much of its position on a Somalia analogy, arguing that an 
all-too-fine line existed between sending in UN forces and eventually having to follow up 
with American soldiers. Pentagon officials were quite wary of having to bail out a 
floundering UN AMIR and, therefore, opposed multilateral involvement at any level. 
This was an understandable concern but one born of selective memory- the costly Battle 
of Mogadishu had been an American not a UN operation. 73 
It appears the United States operated under a significantly flawed understanding 
and interpretation of events. In large part, the Clinton administration first mistakenly 
identified and therefore discussed the Rwanda issue as a peacekeeping matter, as a more 
or less traditional conflict between two armed forces. Therefore, any proposed action to 
alleviate the situation in Rwanda fell under the rubric of peacekeeping and was far more 
likely to fall victim to flawed analogies from the Somalia experience. It also make more 
likely- and perhaps more understandable and defensible- extreme caution and trepidation 
at the thought of interposing any foreign force between the warring parties no matter 
what the reported loss of life. 
73 Power, "A Problem from Hell " America and the Age of Genocide, pp. 370-373. 
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Chapter 6: The Rwandan Genocide in a Comparative Perspective 
Interdisciplinary comparative genocide research is needed for effective prevention 
of the crime of genocide. The comparative approach initially met difficulties. Fears of a 
particular genocide being banalized and the radical claim of singularity for a particular 
community of victims have to be taken seriously. However, the singularity of genocide 
cannot be an obstacle for comparative research. The task is to explore accepted 
categories for comparing genocidal processes. So far there is a minimal consensus 
among the research community only about a few basic elements of genocide analysis 
such as perpetrators, victims, motive, planning, preparation, execution, and result. 
The singularity of the Rwandan genocide 
Wanton brutality and inhumanity are not a peculiarly Rwandan, German, Turkish, 
or Cambodian characteristic; they are a trait of all forms of totalitarian rule. The question 
of how the genocide could have come about, of whether it was a case of a loss of social 
controls or of the systematic planning and execution of mass murder by the state, is one 
that has been posed by Dieter Neubert. 74 In fact, only a combination of the two factors 
can explain it: the systematic nature and dynamic of the official genocide eroded, and 
ultimately completely dissolved, social controls. The thesis, that it was only possible for 
the preplanned genocide to be realized because there was an escalation of violence, 
during which more and more people were caught up in the undertow of this process, runs 
counter to my own thoughts. The thesis is based on the pattern seen in other genocides 
74 Dieter Neubert, The Dynamics of Violence - Processes of Escalation and De-escalation in Violent 
Group Conflicts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999). 
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and assumes the same for Rwanda. The uniqueness of the Rwandan genocide can been 
seen in two related factors: 
1 .  Rwanda 1994 was the first genocide in modem history, which was based on mass 
participation of the common population. The most massive scale of slaughter ever 
seen in human history would have been impossible without hundred of thousands of 
willing executioners. Mass participation during a short period of time (99 days) 
resulted in murderous efficiency. 
2. The intensity of the slaughter was overwhelming from the very first day, from the 
night of April 6-7, and it escalated into generalized butchery within hours. 
Organized mass murder was committed across the whole country over the next days, 
weeks, and months. 
This is not to say that there was no process of escalation leading to the 
generalization of massacres. This process had been started three and a half years earlier, 
on October 1 ,  1990. Measured in terms of the number of people killed (rather than by 
the way in which the killing was done) there was not an increase but a gradual decrease 
in the slaughter. In some areas such as the Butare prefecture, generalized massacres took 
place with a time lag compared to the rest of the country.75 
In parts of the hill country, there was renewed killing weeks after the first 
massacres had taken place. Many of the victims had previously been spared, often 
because their classification (Hutu/Tutsi) had been unclear or because someone had 
offered them protection. Many spent weeks in hiding, only to be discovered later. The 
75 Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to 'Zaire 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999). 
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picture of people being caught up in the undertow is also a bad image in so far as the 
process of escalation began months or years before the actual outbreak of violence, 
triggered by the final order from high up that all Tutsi should be killed. The tendency of 
violence needed for this had been worked up during the thirty-five years of ethnicized 
rule and racial dictatorship. 
An African holocaust 
An eruption of violence like that which occurred in Rwanda in 1994, with the 
capacity to unleash such a monstrous degree of inhumanity, can only happen within the 
extreme framework conditions of totalitarianism, state terror, and organized barbarity. 
Rwanda is a case of total full-scale genocide. In the twentieth century there were four 
cases of total genocide. All key elements of a total genocide have been developed over 
long periods of time. An aggressive ideology that aims at eradication is always based on 
the culmination of pre-existing racist views, doctrines, and attitudes within a society. A 
long period of dehumanization of the victims, and an ever-present fear among the little 
people are present as well. Mass participation also needs incentives. An assurance of 
immunity, reward, or illicit gain is required to bring people to a position where they will 
act as instruments and willing agents of those in power, and in a way that contradicts all 
notion of human dignity. 76 
An analysis of the total genocides committed during the twentieth century shows 
that there are common patterns. The most deadly regimes of this century (measured by 
76 This was the conclusion arrived at, from a different perspective, by the genocide researcher, Rummel. 
R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transactions Publishers, 1994). 
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yearly death rate) were responsible for barbaric attempts to annihilate their minorities.77 
Usually a situation of war or internal troubles provides the best cover for genocide. A 
situation of confusion and jeopardy, in which uncertainty and fear thrive, is one of the 
framework conditions for genocide. Rumors are deliberately fabricated from above, in 
order to enhance the unc·ertainty. In the history of Rwanda since 1959, deliberate rumors 
have played a key role in triggering violence. An atmosphere was created which 
produced a kill or be killed psychosis in individuals. 
The history of genocide since classical times yields a range of illustrative material 
showing that as a rule, 1 )  genocides are carried out before, during, or after wars, mostly 
in conditions of war, and that 2) ideological components play an important part in 
concealing barbarity, in encouraging the population, and in providing a pretext or overall 
racist construction to legitimize events. These elements are clearly displayed in the first 
genocide of this century, against the Armenians in Turkey in 1915, decreed by the 
Committee for Unity and Progress (the Young Turk elite that ruled after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire), and also in the destruction of the Roma in Europe in 1935-45 and the 
Holocaust, the final solution to the Jewish problem in 1939-45, both decreed by the Nazi 
leadership under Hitler. 
The Young Turks justified their genocide by reference to the alleged danger of 
Armenian collaboration with their archenemy Russia. Hitler excluded the Roma on the 
77 These mass murders of civilians took place in the context of war: Pol Pot's Cambodia (1975-9) claimed 
2 million victims, with genocide being perpetrated against Chinese, Muslim (Cham), and Vietnamese 
minorities; Young Turk Turkey (1909-23) produced 1.4 million victims in the genocide of the Armenians 
in 1915-18, plus half a million other victims from 1915-23; the Ustacha regime in Croatia (1941-4) was 
responsible for a genocide of 650,000 Serbs, Jews, and Roma; the Islamic fundamentalist NIF regime in 
Sudan (1989-94) carried out the genocide of 1.5 million Nuba, Dinka, and other people of southern and 
central Sudan. 
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grounds that they were inferior, and placed the blame for the Second World War both on 
international Jewish finance and Jewish Bolshevism. The Akazu power elite initially 
justified its genocide by claiming that the Tutsis, having killed the president, were out to 
kill all Hutus. For the extremists of Hutu Power, the aim was to complete the revolution 
begun in 1959. However senseless, irrational, and pathological such explanations are, 
they are still a crucial part of the overall picture. 78 
Violence and destruction to the point of self-ruination 
Irrational traits figure prominently in Nazi and in Hutu-Power barbarity. In both 
cases, violent processes were taught and planned like a military operation but ultimately 
became uncontrollable. This meant that interests from the beginning, and military, 
power-political, and economic considerations became obsolete as these violent processes 
ran their course. The exterminism of the Nazis and of the Hutu extremists turned into 
self-destruction. 
All the prerequisites and deliberate, strategic measures that constitute the 
conditions for totalitarianism, state terror, and organized barbarity were present in 
Rwanda in over determined form. I demonstrate this by reference to the elements, which 
I mentioned earlier as being necessary for social controls to be eroded and genocide to be 
carried out. Among the most important of these is an aggressive ideology that aims at 
extermination, the dehumanization of the victims, other mechanisms for provoking the 
perpetrators, generalized fear, and war as a cover. Finally, there is the molding of the 
perpetrators, the loyal subjects, without whose delusional obedience and excessive trust 
78 Chalk and Johassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies. 
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in authority no genocide could take place. In the course of my demonstration, I will 
make a step-by-step comparison of Rwandan Tutsi genocide and the Holocaust. 
Ethnicization, exterminatory ideology, and dehumanization 
Unless we can explain the inexplicable, we will not find any answers to the 
question of what can be done in Rwanda to deal with the consequences of the genocide 
and to ensure that what has happened can never be repeated. I am aware that my attempt 
at an explanation is neither complete nor conclusive. It does not begin at zero and is not 
essentially concerned with understanding a foreign culture. Over the last one hundred 
years, the influence of large numbers of missionaries, colonial officials, experts, and 
development workers in Rwanda-Burundi has led to a marked erosion of indigenous 
culture. 
Alongside South Africa, Rwanda is the most Europeanized country in Africa. It 
was not only a country that was colonized; so were the minds of the people. What I talk 
about in the following pages is a barbarity that touches us all and with which all of us are 
familiar. The very same murderous ideology, rooted in nineteenth-century Germany, 
manifested itself in German fascism and in Hutu extremism. This racist ideology, the 
blatant inhumanity of claims about differing worth within the human species, was 
translated into physical violence in just the same way in the Holocaust and in the 
genocide against the Tutsi. 
The aggressive ideology of ethnicization (extremist Hutuism) came into being 
during the 1950s in the path of the church, notably in the seminaries. It is a misdirected, 
opportunistic reaction by the new Hutu elite to the splitting of the Rwandan nation for the 
purposes of indirect rule and to the related creation of a social order, characterized by 
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scandalous inequality and the vile degradation of the Hutu majority. The influence of the 
missionaries, colonial officials, and Catholic Church had played a decisive part in 
bringing about the desperate plight of the oppressed and slighted. The elite abused the 
justified rage of the masses to advance its own struggle for power. The misdirected 
ethnicist Hutuism of the new elites was targeted not at those responsible for the situation 
(the colonial states and the church), but at their tools, the Tutsi. In its capacity as an 
ethnicized social group, the Tutsi aristocracy had been utilized as part of the colonial 
plan, as a means of securing indirect rule, and this entailed an extensive reorganization of 
the pre-colonial system of rule. 
In Rwanda, eliminatory extremism was something that came from above. As in 
Nazi Germany, the highest-ranking representatives of the state were quite brazen in their 
support of it. As mentioned before, over thirty years ago, President Kayibanda, a person 
of the Swiss archbishop Parraudin, had threatened the extinction of the Tutsi as a race.79 
Hitler was already writing about the Final Solution in the 1920s and gave notice of the 
"destruction of the Jewish race in Europe" 80 in the Reichstag at the start of 1939. The 
Jews, of course, like the Rwandan Tutsi, are not a race but a religious community and/or 
social group. Their exclusion as a race was based on the general racism in the Europe of 
the nineteenth century and its infamous theory of the races. Racism permeated not only 
the racial teachings of Count Gobineau, classical German philosophy, and the science of 
ethnology, but also religious ideologies, as in the case of the newly strong age-old anti­
Semitism of the Catholic Church and other Christian churches. Racial ideologies shaped 
79 Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide, p. 155. 
80 Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, 30 Jan. 1939, The History Place, Online, 17 Oct. 2003. 
<http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-threat.htm> 
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the thinking of the Germans and other colonizers about the people they subjugated. They 
also had a destructive impact on the thinking of those who were colonized. 
The dehumanization of the Jews by German fascism is a criminal form of 
scapegoat ideology, just like the dehumanization of the Tutsi as cockroaches and broods 
of vipers. It is no coincidence that a German missionary should have been asked to 
translate Hitler' s  inflammatory text, Mein Kampf, into Kinyarwanda. The policy of Tutsi 
dehumanization is as old as Hutu domination and has produced its own symbols and 
language, familiar to every child in Rwanda. 
Broadcasting of the inflammatory propaganda 
Fear is a dominant element in all rigid, hierarchical societies. In the case of 
Rwanda, the tyranny of earlier centuries has helped bring about a situation in which the 
population's fear is almost a natural state. An assurance of impunity for the perpetrators 
is therefore a key element. The appeal to fear and primitive instincts provided an 
effective catalyst for the genocidal policy._ 
The radio was the main instrument of indoctrination both in Nazi Germany and in 
Rwanda. The RTLM radio station was set up in 1993 by the black Nazi Nahimana, with 
the aid of the Christian Democrat Internationale and equipment from Bavaria. 8 1  The 
relentless primitive campaigning eroded resistance and sought to give the racist creation 
an appearance of normality in the eyes of the masses. The spreading of the inflammatory 
propaganda was achieved via the major private and public media. This obvious abuse of 
press freedom was also a result of the combination of the external top-down 
81 Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide, pp. 25, 223. 
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, p. 1 29. 
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democratization that had been going on since mid- 1990 and the stop-start process of war, 
cease-fires, and the Arusha talks . 82 
82 Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the 
Holocaust, pp. 160-161 .  Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1995: History of a Genocide, pp. 133-135 .  
Frank Chalk, "Hate Radio in Rwanda," in Adelman and Suhrke, The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis 
from Uganda to 7.aire. 
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Chapter 7: A Comparison of Perpetrators: The Executioners of the Final Solution 
Debates among Holocaust scholars can be instructive for those attempting to 
analyze the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Such discussions help to highlight important 
questions to be explored and relevant issues that demand attention. One thing that should 
be noted here is that the war, in the sense of armed hostilities between the FAR and RPA, 
was only happening in a concrete sense in a limited area in the northern mountains, but 
had been turned inward as a permanent state of emergency. War and genocide were 
entwined with one another not at a substantial level, but solely at the level of the 
propaganda put out by a suffering regime and as a perfect cover for the preparations for 
the planned final solution that were now in full swing. 
Among fruitful areas of comparison, the role of the state in sanctioning, 
mobilizing, and organizing genocide is critical. In the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as in 
Germany during the Holocaust, a modem bureaucratic state organized the forces of 
violence, mobilized its citizens, and directed them to kill people of a particular 
category. 83 
In Germany there was a principal target- Jews- and several secondary targets. So 
too in Rwanda, the principal target was people of the Tutsi ethnic category, but Hutu 
political dissenters and opponents to the government were also targeted. In both cases 
the role of the state was important in the use of propaganda as a tool of the perpetrators. 
Drawing on models from elsewhere, especially southeastern Europe and Somalia, 
early reports in the international media cast the violence in Rwanda as a result of state 
83 Alison Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). 
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collapse, which released ethnic tensions and primitive violence. But in Rwanda, as in 
Germany, this was not a case of the implosion of the state; rather, the violence involved 
use of the state apparatus to carry out the conscious policy of a faction within the 
government. Massive killing on the scale of what occurred during the Holocaust and in 
Rwanda is a modern phenomenon, enabled by modern technology.84 In Germany the 
centralized death camps and mass killings made the state presence evident throughout. In 
Rwanda, too, although much killing was done by machete, the power of the state was a 
prevalent presence: guns and grenades were used to kill people gathered in churches and 
stadiums; members of the Interahamwe militias were often former policemen or soldiers 
trained in the use of modern weapons; and political leaders broadcast hate messages on 
the radio. 
Soldiers, police officers, and officials blindly operate on orders under totalitarian 
regimes. Fanatics motivated by political or moral convictions do more than merely carry 
out orders; most importantly, they do it with deliberation and in full conscience without 
inhibition. Nazi Germany and the Habyarimana regime could both count on the latent 
readiness of broad sections of the population to resort to violence. In Rwanda there was 
an especially large number of perpetrators of this kind, probably between several hundred 
thousand and a million farmers and youths. They were afforded the opportunity to 
torture and kill by hand. In contrast, the Holocaust of the Jews and the porajmos 
( destruction of the Roma), first implemented by mass executions, later became industrial 
in nature and could be carried out with much less directly involved manpower. 
84 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, "Introduction," in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, eds, The History 
and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1 990) p. 26. 
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Why did men who were apparently normal citizens engage in murder? 
Another useful area of comparison with the Holocaust is found in questions about 
who participated in the violence. As in the case of the Holocaust, the conduct of 
perpetrators and their followers in Rwanda requires careful analysis. Reference to the 
experiments of Milgram, to intensive indoctrination, and to the conditions prevailing in a 
dictatorship still do not suffice to answer the question of why normal citizens engaged in 
murder. 85 A new historians dispute broke out in 1 996, prompted by Daniel Goldhagen' s 
broad-based investigation into exterminatory anti-Semitism. Goldhagen focused not only 
on the fascist ideologues and behind-the-scenes masterminds of the Third Reich, but on 
the actual executioners and agents of the so-called final solution. 86 In Auschwitz, seven 
thousand SS criminals managed the industrial-style annihilation of more than a million 
Jews. The systematic mass shootings that were carried out in Eastern Europe involved 
four special taskforces containing thirty-eight police battalions made up of sixteen 
thousand German police officers. 87 
The spearhead of the executioner-force 
In Rwanda, the most criminal of the forces, the presidential guard, comprised a 
troop comparable to the SS, officially numbering between six and eight hundred, but 
probably fifteen hundred strong, trained under the supervision of French riot-control 
experts. The total manpower of the fanaticized professional force of the Interahamwe 
(originally hit men of the MRND party), a kind of Rwandan SA, rose to about five 
85 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1992); Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust, pp. 157-170. 
86 Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler 's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Knopf, 1996). 
87 Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. 
thousand in 1993-94, with a further 60,000 - 100,000 killers in reserve. In each local 
community (Rwanda's 147 communes) there were several hundred trained and armed 
militiamen. 88 
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The most horrific murder organization in history, the German SS, was merely the 
leaders of a multinational executioner force, to which were added, in each region, 
thousands of native fascists and extremists (Austrians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, 
Western Ukrainians, Hungarians, etc.) who were directly involved as perpetrators, plus 
hundreds of thousands of police in all the occupied countries, along with soldiers, 
officials, drivers, and other groups of workers, who provided backup for the mass 
murder.89 
In Rwanda, along with the army (35 ,000-40,000), the gendarmes (5 ,000), and the 
local police, about 100,000 soldiers, functionaries, and volunteers, all armed with the 
latest weaponry, took part in the killing.90 In the south of the country, Burundian Hutu 
refugees made up a particularly large proportion of those involved in the slaughter of the 
Rwandan Tutsi. 
Wholesale collective guilt: willing agents? 
In the case of the Holocaust, at least half a million Germans were actively 
involved as direct perpetrators or accessories; millions more, while not getting their own 
hands dirty, rendered themselves guilty of involvement as agitators, informants, or 
bystander. This means that perhaps one percent of the eighty million Germans of the 
time were willing agents of the Holocaust. 
88 Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide, p. 230. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a 
Genocide, pp. 165, 23 1 ,  
89 Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust. 
90 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, p. 246. 
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One willing group not involved in the killing but directly responsible politically 
was the membership of the National Socialist party (NSDAP). One in eight adult 
Germans was a member of this criminal organization. In a certain sense, one in three 
Germans (the number that voted for the NSDAP in free and secret elections in 1932) 
shared in the political responsibility and the guilt. The bourgeois political class and the 
military-industrial complex, which had made Hitler chancellor and brought Nazi fascism 
to power, rendered themselves guilty. Anyone who wanted to find out what sort of 
people he or she was voting for could do so. Hitler had given clear advance notice of the 
Holocaust ten years previously (in Mein Kampf). Kayibanda had threatened the Tutsis 
with extinction thirty years previously. 
Why was there only feeble resistance? 
Anyone looking for collective guilt of a verifiable kind will have no trouble 
finding it in Rwanda. Estimates put the rate of participation amongst the mass of male 
Hutu farmers at 4�6%;91 among the higher professions, the percentage was 
significantly more- 60--80%.92 Measured in terms of the sheer numbers of victims and 
the speed of the mass murder, the tragedy in Rwanda (in April and May 1994) attained 
the same level as, and surpassed, the destruction brought down on the Jews and Roma by 
the Holocaust. In Rwanda too, there was almost no open Hutu opposition to the carrying 
out of genocide; and though there was probably broad passive resistance, this became 
more and more weak as the killing went on. Every fourth person in Rwanda's Hutu 
population was probably directly involved in the genocide, and millions rendered 
91 Chalk, "Hate Radio in Rwanda." 
92 Ibid . .  
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themselves indirectly responsible. Despite huge pressure, many Hutus did not participate 
in the killing, not even as accessories. Consequently, they also refused to leave the 
country along with the killers. 
It may be argued that the active organized resistance to the Nazi dictatorship was 
quickly smashed. But it was only after the havoc wreaked by the Gestapo on the internal 
enemy on the left, and after the state organized mass murders of the left-wing opposition, 
the communists, social-democrats, and other antifascists (the true resistance fighters and 
first occupants of the concentration camps and death camps) that the militant resistance 
diminished virtually to none. The assertion that there were no identifiable forces fighting 
fascism, war, and genocide in Germany is therefore entirely untrue. In official Federal 
German historiography, the old established German political elite were recast in the mold 
of militant resistance fighters, and the allegedly relevant parts of the churches (which for 
centuries had been a safeguard of anti-Semitism and had collaborated closely with the 
Nazi regime) were transformed into an opposition. Such inventions are part of the myths 
that have repeatedly been told in recent German history. Similar myths about resistance 
are being invented on an individual basis in Rwanda; mostly they originate from 
politicians who retrospectively had nothing to do with it all, did not know anything about 
the preparations, and could do nothing about the killing.93 
Well known threats of destruction became grisly realities 
The majority of Germans must have known about the genocide perpetrated on the 
Jews and Roma. Several hundreds of thousands of Jews living in Germany were taken 
away. Synagogues were burnt down in November 1938. Like the Tutsi in Rwanda, 
93 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide. 
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Jewish Germans were beaten up and killed on the streets before the organized eradication 
began. In January 1939, Hitler threatened the Jews with extinction, just as Leon 
Mugesera (vice-president of the MRND) threatened that all Tutsis would be sent back to 
Ethiopia by the shortest route, meaning as corpses via the Nyabarango River. In both 
cases, these threats of destruction became grisly realities-in the case of Rwanda about 
eighteen months later. 
The latest historians' dispute of 1 996, was concerned with the perpetrators, with 
the readiness of ordinary citizens to use violence at the time of fascist totalitarian rule, 
and with the question "Why?" The huge historiographical gap in knowledge about the 
categories of people who acted as agents has finally begun to be closed-decades after 
the German genocide. For some, the question "Why?" inevitably raises the question of 
the specifically German national character. Others point to the centuries old Western 
Christian problem of anti-Semitism, make reference to the incredible racism of the 
nineteenth century and explore the links these two elements have with fascism and 
militarism. No one talks of a Rwandan national character, because, since the introduction 
of German racial theories in about 1 900, the Rwandan nation has been viewed only as 
disconnected individual components. 
Despite apparently very different complex backgrounds, examination of the 
ideological, structural, and material framework conditions governing the Holocaust and 
the Rwandan disaster brings a host of similarities and shared features to light. No highly 
developed metropolitan state and no industrial style extermination in gas chambers and 
ovens is required for racist European ideologies to be translated into reality. The 
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structures of a dictatorial Third World state and destruction by hand, with grenades, 
rifles, and long knives, will do the job in peripheral areas of the world. 
Collective moral responsibility 
Any idea of wholesale collective guilt on the part of the Germans or the Rwandan 
Hutus cannot be proven rationally. In the case of Rwanda, organized internal opposition 
to the dictatorship was weak. The church leaders, particularly the Catholic ones, 
collaborated closely with the regime. There was little opportunity for an independent 
civil society to express itself. Many critics of the regime fell victim to assassination 
attempts by the death squads. The opposition that emerged as a result of the 
democratization introduced by donor countries was very weak. 
Known members of the opposition were the first to be hunted down and murdered 
that April; but the majority of the political class either maintained a fearful silence or 
collaborated openly with the extremists and the genocidal regime. The idea of collective 
guilt is not plausible; the idea of collective moral responsibility, on the other hand, may 
well be. All Rwandans have a collective responsibility to fight racism and fascism so that 
totalitarianism and genocide are never again allowed to occur. 
More comparisons to the Holocaust 
Comparing the genocide in Rwanda to the Holocaust is useful in delineating the 
legal definition of genocide and the importance of honoring international conventions 
relating to it. As is well known, the original catalyst for the UN convention on genocide 
was a commitment in the international community after WWII not to allow such violence 
again. When genocidal killing engulfed Rwanda in April 1994 signatories to the 
convention on genocide had an obligation to take action; as human rights organizations, 
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NGOs, and individual scholar-activists pointed out at the time, this clearly was a case of 
genocide. And like the Holocaust, this type of killing, with the power of the state behind 
it, was not something that ordinary unarmed individuals could stop alone- only organized 
force with command of modern weapons could do that. 
Holocaust denial is yet another area where comparisons can be helpful. As with 
those who have tried to deny the existence of the Nazi gas chambers used to exterminate 
the Jews of Europe, some R wanda�s associated with the pre-genocide government of the 
ex-FAR deny there was a genocide in Rwanda. Yet all the evidence contradicts that 
position.94 
Finally, literature on the Holocaust can help to conceptualize the profound effects 
of this tragedy in shattering Rwandan society and traumatizing its people. As Rwandans . 
have attempted to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of the genocide, they are aware that 
things will never be the same as before. Efforts to preserve the memory of what 
happened and honor victims of the violence serve both to shape collective group 
consciousness and to transmit the hurt to the next generation. 
The imperative of justice 
In a post genocide situation the imperative is justice. The base for integration and 
reconciliation in Rwanda is the application of justice and the rule of law. The new law 
from August 1996 introduced new legal procedures to deal with the perpetrators of 
genocide. Four years after the beginning of the worst genocide since the Holocaust not 
much justice had been done. R wandese criminal courts had the first 304 trials in 1997 
94 De Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda. 
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and 864 in 1998, with 130,000 waiting in overcrowded jails.95 The much better funded 
UN Tribunal remained until 1998 in the phase of preparation. In Arusha only a few of 
the now thirty-five detained perpetrators of genocide are among the authors of the 
genocide. 
The international community is asking itself what can be done. Without some 
measure of justice, there can be no thought of reconciliation in Rwanda. The sheer 
number of murderers and criminals is enough to overburden any judicial system; 
alternative modes of proceeding are therefore required. Nuremberg-style tribunals would 
have to take place on every one of the thousands of hills in Rwanda and Burundi in order 
to have a healing and preventive effect. Nationwide truth commissions operating both 
from below and from above are needed. In many communities, traditional arbitration 
bodies (gachacha) have spontaneously been reactivated. Following the return of two 
million refugees in 1996 and 1997, it is urgent that such efforts are supported.96 The 
spontaneous reactivation of a grassroots plan for arbitration, known as Gachacha, in 
many municipalities gives rise to hopes. 
95 PBS, The Triumph of Evil: Justice in Rwanda, Online, 13 Nov. 2003, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/readings/iustice.html 
Amnesty International, AI Report 1998: Rwanda, Online, 6 Feb. 2004, 
<http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/afr4 7 .htm> 
96 World Wide Refugee Information, Country Report: Rwanda, Online, 1 7  Oct. 2003, 
<http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/rwanda.htm> 
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Chapter 8: Contribution of Comparative Research to Genocide Prevention 
Interdisciplinary comparative genocide research is an outcome for effective 
prevention of the crime of genocide. The comparative approach initially met difficulties. 
Fears of a particular genocide being banalized and the radical claim of singularity for a 
particular community of victims have to be taken serious. However, the horror of 
genocide cannot be an obstacle for comparative research. The task is to explore accepted 
categories for comparing genocidal processes. So far there is a minimal consensus 
among the research comm�nity only about a few basic elements of genocide analysis 
such as perpetrators, victims, motive, planning, preparation, execution, and result. 
Consensus is the distinction between oppression and systematic extermination. 
Policy deficits cause destabilization 
Mass murder of members of minority groups (with states proving impunity to the 
killers) is the worst form of destructive interaction between states and nations / 
nationalities. Especially state organized mass murder and crimes ·against humanity such 
as ethnocide, democide, politicide, and genocide are a matter of great impact on 
international relations. They cause enormous human suffering and affect the stability of 
entire world regions, as recent cases in Southeast Asia, the Hom of Africa, and Central 
Africa have exhibited in the most drastic way. There is no systematic research going on 
nor is there an accountable and comprehensive policy of the international community to 
prevent all out mass violence against non-dominant groups. 
Indicators for genocide prevention 
A dozen broad categories cover in my view the main aspects of genocidal 
processes. A comparative approach would look at the genocidal society in general and 
6 1  
the perpetrators in particular, the development of a exterminatory ideology, the victims as 
constructed by the perpetrators, motivations, the process of victimization, the central role 
of the state and its transformation, process characteristics and dynamics, external 
framework, historic context, the consequences of the crime, the reactions, and the post­
genocidal cover up. 
The process of escalation is being characterized in order to combat and prevent 
the crime of genocide (see Table 2). The purpose is to picture the situation of continuous 
aggravated crisis within each broad category, finally leading to the execution of the crime 
of genocide. 
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Table 2: Early Warning and Genocide Prevention Indicator Box 
95 indicators of successive escalation within ten broad categories 
Genocidal society (1) Development of an exterminatory ideology 
1 .  Characteristics and manipulation of the by the perpetrators (2) 
perpetrator society 9. Replacing unitary and emancipatory 
2. Mobilization of past negative experiences categories of nationhood 
3. Construction of the "problem" 10. Categories of order in "nation building" 
4. Reinforcement and manipulation of old 11. Purified exclusive "national idea" 
stereotypes 12. Futility, "falseness'" and "danger" of 
5. Reinforcement of prejudice, intolerance aliens being assimilated into the nation 
and antipathies 13. Primitivization of alleged ''utopian 
6. Encouraging disposition and readiness for conceptions", borrowed from ethno-
use of violence against the victims centric philosophy & nationalist ideology 
7. Construction of threats 14. "Purposeful rationality" vs. psycho-
8. Building a solid base of confusion and pathological aspects 
insecurity 15. Anti-individualistic bias in the 
construction of dichotic collectivities: us I 
them; nationals / vermin; perpetrators I 
victims 
Construction of the victim group by the The process of victimization ( 4) 
perpetrators (3) 22. Excluding victims from the scope of 
16. Identifying victims normal procedures 
17. Defining the gray zone of mixed elements 23. Systematic spreading of gossip 
18. Signifying victims 24. Heinous rumors about the victims 
19. Deluding vigilance among the victims 25. Public humiliation and harassment of 
20. Ensuring and reinforcing the victims by extremists in daily life 
defenselessness of the victims 26. Impunity for crimes against the victims 
21. Destroying unity, solidarity and resistance 27. Associating victims with all evils 
among the victims by all means 28. Unsanctioned hate propaganda 
29. Dehumanizing victims 
30. Demonizing victims 
The making of a genocidal state (5) Negative dynamics of totalitarism (6) 
31. Infiltration the state machinery / silencing 40. Establishing lines of command for the 
moderate leaders "final solution" of the "problem" 
32. Deepening the general situation of 41. Mobilization of the state bureaucracy for 
political crisis and disorientation planning / organizing genocide 
33. Creation of more confusion and fear 42. Coercive mobilization of civil servants 
34. Division of roles/labor between authors- 43. Secret systematic preparation of the final 
ideologists and the state apparatus solution 
35. Free hand for planers of crime of genocide 44. Organization of special troops, militias 
36. Free hand for propagandists and/or gangs 
37. Extremists take over media 45. Training of the executioners 
38. Coercion of the state bureaucracy for 46. Spreading of mass hatred 
"purification" (campaign of fear) 4 7. Creating of the "ripe moment" 
39. Exclusive ideologies in schools and public 48. Ruthless execution of the crime by all 
places means 
Table 2: Continued 
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Development of a conductive social-political 
environment (7) 
49. Propagandist onslaught to win over the 
national population 
50. Supply of ambiguous identification 
possibilities 
5 1 .  Normalcy and necessity of escalation 
52. Undermining social solidarity with victims 
amongst the perpetrator society 
53 . Diffusion of normalcy 
54. Normality of "special procedures" 
55. Appeals to complicity (supply of more 
privileges) 
Building of a totalitarian state and 
establishing of total state control (9) 
62. Decapitation of opposition 
63 . Liquidation of the political opposition 
64. Liquidation of all dissent 
65 . Public humiliation of neutral personalities 
66. Showing resolute ruthless leadership 
67 . Open criminal agitation 
68 . Intentions of the killers become know 
69. Appeal to the most primitive instincts 
70. Arbitrary arrest of doubtful nationals 
7 1 .  Exhibiting final determination of the top 
leader(s) and his/their ring leaders 
72. Public acts of violence against last rest of 
former opposition 
73. Open violence against victim group 
74. Spreading and generalizing fear 
Conductive context for genocide: 
War or crisis as smoke screen (11) 
82. Skilful interpretation of contradictions in 
top leaders' policy 
83. Skilful use of framework of war and crisis 
84. Delusion of the international community 
85 . Use of emergency situation to cut access 
to information 
86. Play of diplomatic dementia 
87. Tricking international media 
88. Use of the ripe moment 
89. Presentation of an all-out operation as 
singular acts for foreign consumption 
Development of a genocidal environment 
(8) 
56. Brainwashing in schools / public places 
57. Permanent hate propaganda in the state 
controlled media: lies, falsifications, 
fabrications, gossip 
58. Compulsory use of derogatory 
expressions for victims 
59. Humiliating expressions for alleged 
accomplices of the victims 
60. Attempt for breaking down the 
(traditional) moral order 
6 1 .  Public chasing and beating of victims 
Preference for the option of outright 
violence and extermination (10) 
75. Construction of the "problem" 
76. Reinforcing its plausibility 
77. Breaking resistance among the "national" 
population 
78. Supplying a problem-solving model 
79. Invitations for fatalist acceptance of state 
terror 
80. Creating the full atmosphere for 
extermination 
8 1 .  Executing the problem-solving model 
Misinformation and denial (12) 
90. Misinformation campaign claiming 
punitive acts and preventive action 
9 1 .  Launching well-prepared cover-up 
operations by the perpetrators 
92. Banalizing the crime of genocide claiming 
isolated events, unfortunate incidents, 
individual cases of wrongdoers, etc . 
93. Threatening or silencing witnesses 
94. Destruction of evidence ( especially 
official documents) 
95. Outright denial of genocide 
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Chapter 9: Perspectives for Genocide Prevention 
Comparative genocide research might well contribute to the development of a 
global early warning system ( e.g. by working on reliable indicators) and to establish 
effective structural prevention of genocide. Quantitative indicators to measure economic 
and political discrimination of ethnic groups by state governments and indicators to 
measure the use of violence by governments have been developed by Gurr and Barff. 97 
The idea is to develop qualitative indicators for minorities at risk of genocide without 
excluding possible quantitative aspects. 
Searching for signs of eminent danger and identifying indicators for alert 
Global data collections showing low and high scales of discrimination of 
minorities are of special interest since discrimination as an essential aspect of the 
victimization process characterizing every genocide. 98 Danger is eminent in the category 
of highest discrimination. The measures applied by states are similar to those of 
genocidal processes, such as formal and deliberate exclusion and/or recurring repression. 
According to the findings of the Minorities-at-risk Project nearly a fifth of all 
minorities at risk suffer deliberate exclusion and repression by state actors, with a 
disproportionate concentration of minorities at high risk in Middle East and Africa. 99 The 
severity of discrimination is greatest in the Middle East and among ethno-classes. 100 The 
latter category is particular prominent in the Central African region of the Great Lakes. 
97 Barff and Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) pp. 87-92. 
98 Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict, Washington: US-Institute of 
Peace, 1993, p.44. 
99 Minorities at Risk, Online, 20 Sept. 2003, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about/definition.htm> 
100 Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict, pp. 45-48. 
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Genocide prevention includes the abolition of impunity for gross human rights violation 
and gives a clear signal to potential perpetrators. The base for reconciliation is justice. 
Development of indicators for a system of effective early warning 
Indicators warning of serious risk of genocide or mass violence against vulnerable 
groups can be deduced from the escalation patterns explored within the previously 
mentioned ten comparative categories. In order to remove indicators of alert for the 
purpose of on-the-spot-monitoring of human rights violations and early warning it would 
be necessary to assemble the identified elements of genocidal processes according to 
stages of urgency and significance. Indicators would be deduced as signifiers for high 
alert. 
The challenge of genocide prevention is chiefly the identification of aspects of 
significant aggressiveness, the timely reading of signs for growing determination of the 
perpetrators in the genocidal process, and the identification of triggers of rapid escalation. 
Table 3 gives an overview of the tasks, preceedures, institutions, and voids of genocide 
prevention. I focus on areas of activities, which are essential to combat and eliminate 
genocide: Early Warning, Early Action, Persecution and Deterrence, Enforcement of 
International Law, Pressure, Vigilance and Protection, and, Lessons Learned. 
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Table 3: Systematic Overview on the Tasks, Precedures, Institutions and Voids of 
Genocide Prevention: Critical Areas of Activities 
Early Warning Early Action 
• Global monitoring of gross human rights • High level diplomacy in cases of alert 
violations shall be coordinated • Development of new mechanisms of rapid 
• Clear-cut indicators for early warning reaction in cases of red alert 
about serious risk of genocide • Organizing political will for averting 
• Development of an integrated early genocide 
warning and early response system • Organizing political will for mandatory 
• Special UN task force for processing data military intervention of UN and 
on minorities-at-risk and development of protection of the victims in case of 
behavior of dangerous gangster regimes genocide 
• Permanent information of UN Security 
Council and key decision makers about 
high-risk situations (minorities at risk) 
Persecution and Deterrence Enforcing International Law: 
• Mandatory persecution for perpetrators of • by comprehensive review processes and 
genocide in anyone state checks-and-control, as in the case of the 
• Establishment of special persecution European Convention on Human Rights 
institutions / ending impunity or in the case of the ILO convention 169 
• A permanent international tribunal for the • by institution building, as in the case of 
crime of genocide shall be OSCE ( e.g. High Commissioner for 
institutionalized as integral part of the Minorities), or the ICC, in order to 
UN system outlaw gross human rights violations 
• ICC established and adhered to such as genocide and crimes against 
• International criminal law has to be humanity (ICC is still meeting strong 
developed in order for the rule of law to resistance by large states such as USA 
be respected by all states and political and France) 
actors • by refining an arsenal of sanctions, which 
shall hurt the regimes not the people 
Pressure, Vigilance and Protection Lessons Learned 
• UN, regional organizations and donor • Learning from experience of genocide-
states shall impose conditions or free regions of the world 
disincentives on development aid in case • Fighting powerlessness and passive 
of abuse, violations, threats, state response on genocide 
criminality • Development of concepts of structural 
• Incentives shall promote democratization, prevention of genocide 
respect for basic human rights and • Writing genocide prevention into statutes, minority rights, rule of law, good domestic laws, constitutions, governance international conventions, pacts, etc. 
• Monitoring risk areas and minorities at risk • Standardizing prevention of genocide and (by INGOs, local NGOs, IGOs, etc.) mass violence internationally 
• Averting genocide I breaking escalation 
through presence and media coverage 
• Rapid and broad system of protection of 
possible victims 
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Conclusions 
Despite impressive growth in international law outlawing crimes against 
humanity and even with war crimes tribunals, the world has failed to deter genocide and 
large-scale ethnic violence and to prosecute offenders. Meanwhile, billions of dollars 
have been provided for humanitarian relief, tens of thousands of peacekeepers have been 
deployed, hundreds of commissions have written thousands of reports, and a library of 
scholarly research and writing has been published. But can we not do better? 
The Geneva War Conventions protect the rights of civilians in warfare, prohibit 
hostage talcing and reprisals, excessive military actions, torture, summary executions, and 
hold states and armies accountable for compliance. Recently, some of these provisions 
have been extended to internal wars, not just wars between states. Most of these 
prohibitions and others not listed here have been violated on a massive scale in Rwanda, 
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Why? 
International law itself is contradictory. A cornerstone of the international order 
is the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. According to the legalist 
paradigm in international relations, the international system establishes for states the 
rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The use of force by one state 
against the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of another constitutes aggression 
and is a criminal act. The moral argument for intervention by outsiders is justified when 
a state continually uses violence, terror, and genocide against its people. The legalist and 
moral principles are contradictory. The United Nations as an institution was not designed 
to deal with aggression of a state against its own citizens. The notion of a just war, of 
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humanitarian intervention to stop a government that commits crimes against humanity on 
its own citizens, seldom supplants the principle of state sovereignty. The permanent 
members of the Security Council and their close allies have partisan interests in ethnic 
conflicts that override humanitarian intervention, unless it is a precedent against their 
own and their allies' ethnic problems. The permanent members can veto UN action, and 
the UN needs their military, logistic, and financial support for effective prevention of 
genocide. Endless diplomacy can be a cover and excuse for avoiding effective 
intervention. Domestic public opinion is difficult to mobilize before massacres occur, 
and is sensitive to casualties from peacekeeping in distant places. Economic sanctions 
imposed after genocides are evaded. War crimes tribunals have not deterred. The 
chances are small that the war criminals and perpetrators of genocide will be brought to 
justice. Current modes of international intervention in ethnic conflict and current 
enforcement of international law on crimes against humanity have not prevented 
genocide. Our best bet is crisis intervention with military force, in the short run, and a 
democratic constitution and regime tailored for societies divided on ethnicity, 101 and the 
institutions that sustain democracy, in the long run .  
I have compiled a list of my findings and those from previous scholarship about 
genocide. Would these indicators have provided early warning in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda? The answer is a resounding yes. Rwanda had a previous genocide in 1962; it 
was an ethnically stratified society; it had a non-democratic military regime; France was 
a powerful protector; the descendants of the Tutsi victims formed the Rwanda Patriotic 
Front and had invaded with a military force; the Rwanda government was losing the war; 
101 Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," pp. 451-476. 
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the regime was forced into a negotiated settlement of power sharing with the RPF and the 
return of half a million Tutsi refugees. With state support, the extremist anti-Tutsi party, 
the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, and top people close to the president 
mounted a radio and leaflet campaign of hatred and incitement to kill, specifically 
targeting moderate Hutus and Tutsi leaders by name. Meanwhile militias were recruited 
openly in the streets and sent in groups of hundreds to military camps for weapons 
training and indoctrination, and were organized for the genocide. These preparations 
were supplemented with the distribution of guns to government supporters and with 
ethnic mobilization. The preparations for genocide and the already ongoing ethnic 
violence were observed by the diplomatic corps, human rights and other NGOs, UN 
agencies, and religious organizations. 
Illuminated by early warning indicators, the Yugoslav wars and genocides tell a 
similar tale: non-democratic state, ethnic power relations threatened by constitutional 
changes and secessions, prior history of genocide, powerful outside states supporting 
different groups, massive hate and fear propaganda in the media, ethnic rebellions that 
challenge the authorities, paramilitary militias for genocide sponsored by governments 
and the army. As for genocide itself, there were ample trial runs on a smaller scale: the 
siege and shelling of Dubrovnike; the leveling of Vukovar and the massacre of the male 
survivors after it fell. 1 02 The Bosnian war started with a massacre and war crimes at 
Zvornik, witnessed by a high UN official who happened to be driving through. 1 03 
102 V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International 
Security 19(3) pp. 133 .  
103 Kresse), Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, p. 19. 
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Eventually UN peacekeepers were deployed; they spent much effort on recording 
violations of cease fires, trying to figure out who was responsible for an unending stream 
of war crimes and atrocities, and how to prevent humanitarian relief workers, equipment, 
and shipments from falling into the hands of combatants. UN peacekeeping was unable 
to lift the siege of Sarajevo and stop ethnic cleansing and war crimes. After the creation 
of UN protected zones, Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica were forced to surrender to 
civilians under their protection to General Mladic's  executioners, knowing full well the 
outcome. 
In contrast to these international peacekeeping disasters, some observers believe 
that the deployment of an international military force at the very start of these countries 
showing genocidal signs would have deterred the genocide. General Dallaire estimated 
5,000 soldiers in Rwanda would have prevented the genocide while about 10,000 was 
estimated by Radovan Karadzic for Bosnia-Serbia.104 
I believe the task of genocide prevention is a humanitarian imperative at the end 
of a century marked by the most disturbing negative dialectics of modernity and 
barbarism. On the fifty years anniversary of the Anti-Genocide Convention in December 
1 998, the UN was called upon to amend the Convention comprehensively. Genocide 
prevention has to be standardized internationally. Mass murder as a possible option for 
failed states to deal with minorities has to stop once and for all. 
104 Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide, pp. 284, 340. 
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